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Sweeping regulatory reforms in Britain produced the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) resulting in a significant increase in mandatory disclosure.  Because greater 
transparency of information is a major objective for the FSA, shifting from one information 
system to another has re-distributive effects.  We identify these effects at a sector level and 
their drivers at the firm level. 
 
At a sector level, the FSA has generally increased the precision of investors’ priors 
reducing the information risk component of the cost of capital.  At a firm level, large firms 
act as “Stackelberg leaders” in voluntary disclosure games. FSA regulation counteracts the 
strength of the leaders and shifts power to the “followers”. 
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Seldom does an opportunity present itself to test the effectiveness of mandatory 
regulatory objectives than for an economy such as Britain’s that moved from regulation by 
function, designed around many separate agencies, to a system of centralized mandated 
regulation (Dale and Wolfe (2003), Goodhart, Hartmann, Llewellyn, Rojas-Suárez and 
Weisbrod (1998)). Recently, the passing of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (the 
Act) on November 30, 2001 introduced sweeping regulatory reforms in the United Kingdom 
with the formation of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). In relation to this Act, the 
then Chairman of the FSA (Sir Howard Davies) commented
3: 
 
“No other major country has re-engineered the whole of its financial regulation at one time” 
 
The importance of disclosure was high on the list of assumptions for this major re-
engineering:  
 
“Transparency of information in the marketplace promotes market discipline, which in turn 
maintains standards of conduct.”
4
 
In this paper, we focus on measuring the effectiveness of this re-engineering, relative 
to regulatory objectives for the four key UK financial market sectors.  Further, at a micro 
level, we adopt a game theoretic approach and analyse the impact of the regulation upon the 
voluntary disclosure game for companies within these four sectors.  Two of the sectors 
shifted from a régime of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to a single regulatory agency 
while the other two shifted from a set of regulatory agencies to the same single agency, the 
FSA.  The overriding objectives were to increase market confidence,  public awareness, 
                                                 
3 FSA Annual Report 2000/2001, 
4 FSA web site page Updated August 13, 2002:  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/approach/1_philosophy.html
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consumer protection, and reduce crime potential by attaining greater transparency of 
information within a single agency.   The FSA’s objectives are backed up by a draconian list 
of criminal and civil penalties arising from “market abuse” defined as “improper conduct 
that undermines the UK financial markets or damages the interests of ordinary market 
participants.”
5  
It is well known that shifting from one information system to another information 
system will have re-distributive effects (Demski (1973), Demski (1974)).  The two central 
objectives of this paper are to identify these re-distributive effects at the sector level then to 
identify the drivers of observed sector level behavior by identifying the re-distributive effects 
a t  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  f i r m  l e v e l .   T h e  f o r m e r  objective has important implications for the 
information risk component of the cost of equity capital of firms within each sector (Easley 
and O'Hara (2004)).  The latter objective has important implications for gaining a better 
understanding of the nature of conflicts of interest within the voluntary disclosure game 
(Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), Dye (1990)).    
Analytically, the re-distributive effects can go in different directions.  Increased levels 
of mandated disclosure can have both positive and negative implications for different firms 
in the economy.  As a result, the aggregate or net effect becomes an empirical issue.  In this 
paper we test for these re-distributive effects by extracting out information using a new 
methodology.  This methodology is designed to measure the impact of re-distributive effects 
upon the risk neutralized distribution under the assumption that prices are arbitrage free. 
 
                                                 
5 www.fsa.gov.uk/enforcement/market_abuse.html .  The criminal offences are making a misleading statement 
and engaging in a misleading course of conduct for the purpose of inducing another person to exercise or 
refrain from exercising rights in relation to investments. Civil offences involve behavior based on information 
not generally available to those using the market, which is likely to be regarded by regular users of the market as 
relevant when deciding the terms of transactions; and a failure to observe a reasonable standard of behavior. 
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We focus on four market sectors – Banking, General Insurance, Life Assurance, and 
Investment Companies.  In three out of the four sectors (excluding Life Assurance) the FSA 
regulation appears to have had a positive impact relative to stated regulatory objectives.   
Furthermore, at a micro level, we obtain support for the hypothesis that the pre-FSA 
voluntary disclosure game can be viewed as a “Stackelberg leader” game.  In this game the 
leader exploits their access advantage to channels of voluntary disclosure acting in their own 
self interest.  Post regulation, observed re-distributive effects at a micro level are consistent 
with the FSA regulation serving to counteract the strength of the Stackelberg leader in favor 
of the “followers”.   In each sector the observed leader was the largest firm. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section I sets out a brief history of the Financial 
Services Authority. Section II provides an overview of the economic implications from the 
FSA regulation. Section III reviews existing literature that will support testable implications. 
Section IV provides a game theoretic interpretation of existing evidence together with 
testable hypotheses. Section V sets out our methodology. Our results are discussed in 
Section VI. Section VII concludes. 
Section I: Brief History of the Financial Services Authority 
 
In May 1997, just days after coming to power following the general election in 
Britain, the incoming Labour Government radically altered the regulatory landscape of UK 
financial institutions by announcing the formation of the FSA. The new Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced in May 1997 that the responsibilities for financial 
services regulation in the UK would be merged into a single entity (Briault (1999)). This 
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would entail bringing together nine separate bodies
6, including those responsible for 
banking, securities and insurance business, and for markets and exchanges. The UK Listing 
Authority was added later within the FSA’s remit. The Chancellor rationalized this 
consolidation reflecting developments in the financial markets as follows:   
 
“The existing arrangements for financial regulation involve a large number of regulators, each 
responsible for different parts of the industry. In recent years there has been a blurring of the 
distinctions between different kinds of financial services business: banks, building societies, 
investment firms, insurance companies and others. This has added further to the complexity 
of financial regulation. The Government believes the current system is costly, inefficient and 
confusing for both regulated firms and their customers. It is not delivering a standard of 
supervision and investor protection that the public has a right to expect. We are therefore 
establishing a single, statutory regulator for the UK financial services industry with clearly 
defined regulatory objectives and a single set of coherent functions and powers.”
7
 
Prior to the establishment of the FSA, the UK’s financial regulatory régime was 
based on specialist functional regulation involving numerous separate agencies (Dale and 
Wolfe (2003)). The Bank of England was responsible for the supervision of banks; the 
Department of Trade and Industry for insurance; and the Securities and Investments Board 
(SIB) for securities business. The SIB was a private body financed by charges levied on the 
investment industry. The SIB did not regulate directly individual firms but rather devolved 
day to day supervision to a number of Self Regulatory Organizations (SROs). Under the 
                                                 
6 The Securities and Investments Board, the Personal Investment Authority, the Investment Management 
Regulatory Organisation, the Securities and Futures Authority, the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the 
Bank of England, the Building Societies Commission, the Insurance Directorate of the Department of Trade 
and Industry, the Friendly Societies Commission, and the Registrar of Friendly Societies. 
7 H M Treasury (1998a), “Financial Services and Markets Bill: A Consultation Document. Part One. Overview 
of Financial Regulatory Reform”. H M Treasury, London, July (page 8) 
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terms of the then relevant legislation (The Financial Services Act, 1986) all institutions 
undertaking investment business were to be monitored either by one of the SROs, or by the 
Wholesale Markets Supervision Division of the Bank of England, or else directly by the SIB. 
In practice, most firms opted to be regulated by one of the SROs, each of which specialised 
in regulating institutions in particular lines of business. The three SROs were the Personal 
Investments Authority (conduct of business of financial advisers including life assurance), 
the Securities and Futures Authority (securities firms), and the Investment Management 
Regulatory Organisation (fund managers).  
 
We focus on four UK market indices together with major companies therein to 
detect the effectiveness of self regulation in the United Kingdom. These indices are: 
•  FTSE Investment Companies (FAINVC) which is a capitalization weighted 
index of 115 member companies 
•  FTSE Life Assurance Index (FALIFE) which is a capitalization weighted 
index of 7 member companies 
•  FTSE Banks Index (FABANK) which is a capitalization weighted index of 
11 member companies 
•  FTSE Insurance Index (FAINSU) which is a capitalization weighted index of 
15 member companies 
 
Section II: Economic Implications from the FSA Regulation 
 
The passing of the Act resulted in a single regulatory body, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) and created an enforceable obligation for the financial sector to increase 
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disclosure.  This commitment is likely to make some entities better off and others worse off.  
This follows from a well known result for information systems, that if the systems are not 
complete finer disclosure will always have re-distributive implications (e.g., Demski (1973), 
Demski (1974)).  Re-distributive effects are implied from the change in the equilibrium 
allocations.  For example, in a general equilibrium analysis of expectations, information, 
prices and the production/investment decision changing the fineness of disclosure shifts the 
economy from one rational expectations equilibrium to another (e.g., Kanodia (1980)). Re-
distributive effects are further complicated by the presence of disclosure externalities (e.g., 
Dye (1990)).  Disclosures by one firm can influence investor expectations about other 
firm(s) in the sector or economy.  Finally, this has important implications for equilibrium 
risk premiums because it changes the fraction of information that is public versus private 
(Easley and O'Hara (2004)).  Therefore, the complex problem facing regulators is what 
equilibrium is being implemented and how important are the re-distributive effects.    
 
In this section we first review the stated regulatory objectives and then identify the 
linkages that exist between stated objectives and economic drivers identified in the existing 




The objectives of the FSA, as stated in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
are: 
•  Market Confidence 
•  Public Awareness 
•  The protection of consumers 
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•  The reduction of financial crime 
 
The Act covers the financial services sector that provides financial products and 
services to individuals and other firms.  In the UK, this can be categorized into the following 
sub-sectors: Banks (covering commercial and investment (or merchant) banking), Life 
Insurance, General Insurance, and Investment Firms (managing portfolios for clients, similar 
to mutual funds).  The first three sectors are dominated by five or six large institutions 
whereas the fourth sector consists of a much larger number of entities.  As a result, there is a 
difference in industrial organization such that investment firms are a different sector from 
the other three.   
 
As set out in the introduction to this paper, high on the list for how the regulatory 
objectives is to attain greater transparency of information flows in the market
8.   There is an 
explicit attempt to ensure consistency between the stronger regulatory disclosure 
requirements of the FSA and the financial markets.  This goal has strong prior empirical 
support in its favor.  For example, in a recent extensive review of the literature by Flannery 
(1998) supports the following conclusion: 
 
“The available empirical evidence suggests that regulators could expand their reliance on 
market discipline, at least for large, publicly owned institutions.” 
 
The FSA has placed particular emphasis on this type of issue when implementing 
stated regulatory objectives.  We examine implications from these issues in the sequence they 
have been addressed in the existing analytical literature.  This literature starts with the 
                                                 
8 FSA web site page Updated August 13, 2002:  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/approach/1_philosophy.html
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fundamental question of whether there is a need for regulation in the first place and goes on 
to identify conditions under which regulation can play a role. 
Section III: Literature Review 
 
Both “Essays on disclosure” Verrecchia (2001) and a subsequent critique by Dye 
(2001) provide definitive reviews of the extant accounting literature on disclosure. We focus 
on several specific papers to further our hypotheses. First, consider disclosure in an 
unregulated voluntary market.  Early insights from the voluntary disclosure literature raised 
serious questions whether mandating disclosure could have any additional affect upon the 
information set available to agents in the economy.  These papers observed that if it is 
costless to disclose truthfully a fully separating equilibrium results (e.g., Grossman and Hart 
(1980), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981)).   Full separation is induced by investors who 
keep revising downwards their expectations of about the quality of non disclosers which in 
turn induces additional disclosure until there is nothing left to disclose.  Full separation, 
however, is inconsistent with historical observations.  For example, in the US prior to the 
1933/34 Securities’ Acts, some firms disclosed voluntarily information required under the 
regulation whereas others chose not to disclose.  This observation provides direct support 
for the existence of a threshold point for voluntary disclosure.  In the analytical literature, it 
has been established that if it is costly to disclose information then a disclosure threshold 
results at the point where the marginal benefit from not disclosing equals the marginal cost 
from disclosing (Grossman and Hart (1980), Jovanovic (1982), Verrecchia (1983), Verrecchia 
(1990)).  The threshold point separates two types of equilibrium, pooling versus separating.  
Important drivers of the threshold point have been identified in the subsequent voluntary 
disclosure which falls into two strands: exogenous disclosure costs (Verrecchia (1983), 
  9ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2004-12 
 
Verrecchia (1990)) and endogenous disclosure costs (Dye (1985), Dye (1986), Jung and 
Kwon (1988)).  For the latter endogenous disclosure costs arise from the conflicts of self 
interests when investors are not sure whether the manager is in possession of the 
information. 
 
Viewed from either of the above perspectives, a set of empirically testable 
predictions can be derived for the impact of mandated disclosure on the voluntary disclosure 
threshold.  First we observe that mandated disclosure restricts the set of voluntary disclosure 
strategies which in turn will impact the voluntary disclosure threshold.  On the surface it may 
appear that restricting the strategy set immediately favors voluntary disclosure over 
mandated disclosure.  But this is not the case because of the different implied redistributive 
effects
9.  In the context of a stock market economy, mandating disclosure has two 
complementary effects.  First, it reduces the probability of insiders being privately informed with 
price sensitive information and conversely it increases the precision of investor priors regarding 
assessed future value distributions.  Under either interpretation, when viewed from this 
perspective, any change in investors’ expectations will have a measurable impact upon the 
voluntary disclosure threshold.  In addition, this impact is same irrespective of whether 
disclosure costs are endogenous (e.g., Proposition 2 of Jung and Kwon (1988)) or exogenous 
(Corollary 2, Verrecchia (1990)).  The methodology introduced in this paper is designed to 
exploit this measurable implication.   
If this voluntary disclosure theory is applied to a sector, (e.g., shifts in investors’ 
expectations relative to a sector fund), it is consistent with reducing systematic risk levels.
10  
                                                 
9 For example, Fishman and Hagerty (2003) discuss this point and illustrate with their analysis of insider trading 
(1995). 
10 Technically, if prices are arbitrage free and the risk neutralized terminal price distributions is lognormal as 
characterized in the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing world, there is a strictly monotonic relationship 
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We note that although the traditional view in finance is that only market risk is priced, this 
view is supported by assuming there are no informational asymmetries.  In a privately 
informed economy information risk is also priced (e.g.  Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara 
(2002), Easley and O'Hara (2004)).  As a result, mandating finer disclosure has a positive 
impact in terms of the usual regulatory objectives when viewed from the perspective of 
information risk, and therefore cost of equity capital, being reduced
11. 
 
In summary, what stops the complete unraveling of information in a voluntary 
disclosure economy are the “costs” associated with disclosure
12.  In this context, the role of 
regulation can be viewed as imposing a forced override of these costs at an individual entity 
level to increase social welfare from the implied re-distributive effects.  This aspect of the 
problem has not been analyzed in the literature reviewed above because the focus is on the 
implications from introducing disclosure costs as opposed to considering industry or 
economy wide implications.  The set of papers reviewed in the next section relax this 
restriction.  This literature considers how a disclosure from one firm can impact inferences 
made by investors/managers in relation to the disclosing and other firms.  That is, 
externalities associated with the disclosure are taken into account. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
between the shift in the threshold and the volatility of the underlying price change process.  That is, if the 
threshold shifts to the right volatility will decline and vice versa an implication that can be drawn from 
proposition 3, Jung and Kwon (1988). This point is discussed further in section 5 of this paper.   
11 It is noted that although questions regarding consistency with regulator objectives are addressed the more 
comprehensive issue regarding the impact of disclosure upon social welfare is not addressed in this section.  
Attempts to model this latter issue consider the relationship between disclosure and externalities which is 
reviewed in the next section.  
12 Cost can be broadly interpreted.  For example, in Fishman and Hagerty (2003) this “cost” is an information 
processing cost (sophisticated versus unsophisticated consumers).  But this is applied to a consumer product 
market and therefore the issue of arbitrage free pricing is not considered. 
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Role of Externalities 
 
Dye (1990) finds the regulator’s mandated disclosure problem is to choose the 
optimal disclosure policy to maximize social welfare for the economy exploiting any 
externalities defined in terms of systematic risk (i.e., covariance).  The regulator exploits 
externalities to increase social welfare allowing for re-distributive effects.  This can be 
contrasted with the entrepreneur’s voluntary disclosure problem which is to choose the 
optimal disclosure policy for the firm motivated by self interest.  Dye (1990) considers two 
types of externalities, “real” and “financial”, based upon whether or not the cash flows of 
firms are altered (real) versus assessed values (financial).  Initial owners must commit to a 
disclosure policy (i.e., a level of precision) which in turn generates the information that is 
reported to the market.  The decision is made to maximize expected utility of existing 
owners who ultimately sell to the next “generation” of owners after the realized disclosure.  
In this setting mixed results were obtained for the benefits of mandated vis-à-vis voluntary 
disclosure.   
 
In an attempt to refine the insights from an economy of this nature, Admati and 
Pfleiderer (2000) imposed additional structure focusing, in particular, on risk neutrality, on 
exogenous disclosure costs, and on exogenous value increasing transactions made available 
to the firm (i.e., selling the firm to new investors generated an exogenous gain).  In this 
economy, the first best allocation is simply defined as the case where the sale of firm always 
occurs and all exogenous gains are fully exploited.  Voluntary disclosure is analyzed in terms 
of the Nash equilibria associated with self interested actions taken by firms ignoring welfare 
implications from externalities that are present in the disclosure game.  Mandated disclosure, 
on the other hand, takes into account the welfare implications from externalities but is 
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constrained by the disclosure satisfying a constant lower bound level of precision imposed 
upon all firms by the regulator.  Results again are mixed and both mandated and voluntary 
disclosure can be socially optimal given specific characteristics of the economy.  One 
implication of the constant mandated threshold is that some firm’s voluntary disclosure 
threshold is increased and others decreased.  There are predicted re-distributive implications 
among firms in the voluntary disclosure game that are potentially measurable in terms of 
threshold shifts.  In addition, from the disclosure games, mandated disclosure is likely to 
have its greatest impact when correlations are higher.  This suggests that the disclosure 
regulation is better targeted towards an industry or sector of the economy, where 
correlations are likely to be higher.   
 
In summary, by considering externalities associated with mandated disclosure the 
social planner’s problem of mandating a minimal level of disclosure precision to maximize 
social welfare can be contrasted with the manager’s problem of choosing a level of 
disclosure precision acting in the firm’s self interests.  Welfare comparisons of these two 
problems leads to mixed results, which reinforces the need for gathering empirical evidence 
relevant to assessing the potential importance of externalities and the nature of any implied re-
distributive effects.   As a result, next we interpret existing empirical findings in the light of the 
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Section IV: Game Theoretic Interpretation of Existing Evidence 
 
Interpreting voluntary disclosure in the presence of externalities, from a game 
theoretic approach, allows finer interpretations to be made.  First, Simon (1989) when 
analyzing the impact of the 1933 Securities Act on investor information, concludes that the 
1933 Act and subsequent regulation “contributed to the growth of the Over-the-Counter 
Market.”   Small firms were made better off and new issues grew as a possible result of the 
regulation.  In part, this is consistent with the implications from Easley and O'Hara (2004) 
who suggest that with reduced information risk the cost of equity capital for firms will 
reduce.  Beardsley and O'Brien (2004) report an interesting similar result for the impact of 
regulation 70-years later in relation to firm size and over-the-counter markets. They examine 
the behavior of the voluntary disclosure threshold pre and post the 2000/2002 Regulation 
FD and Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the US and observe a systematic difference between the 
DJIA/S&P500 large firm indexes versus the NASDAQ/Amex small firm indexes.   The 
difference was that for both NASDAQ and AMEX, post the regulation, the threshold 
moved to the right (investors’ prior precision increased) whereas for DJIA/S&P500 the 
threshold moved to the left (investors’ prior precision decreased).  If reduction in the cost of 
equity capital, by reducing the information risk component, is the motivation, this evidence 
is consistent with small firms being made better off relative to larger firms in both the US 
1933/1934 and 2000/2002 regulatory periods.   
 
To understand these dynamics better it is useful to consider further insights from a 
game theoretic analysis of the disclosure game.  The game theoretic approach to mandatory 
versus voluntary disclosure implies that firms take into account externalities resulting from 
their interdependencies.  Further, equilibrium outcomes are sensitive to the behavioral 
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assumption regarding how these interdependencies are exploited.  For example, in an 
industry of identical firms, a Cournot equilibrium may be appropriate because the behavioral 
assumption implies that a competitor’s disclosure does not change in response to a change in 
their own disclosure.  But, if differential access to channels of voluntary disclosure is taken 
into account the asymmetries that this creates in a voluntary disclosure game can lend 
support to a different behavioral assumption.   
 
Consider a disclosure game where large firms have an access advantage to channels 
of communication.  Large firms in the voluntary disclosure game can now become Stackelberg 
leaders (Stackelberg (1934), Daughety (1990)).   For example, Stackelberg leaders can exploit 
other firms’ reaction functions when making voluntary disclosures to make themselves better 
off in the sense of reducing their cost of equity capital by increasing investors’ prior 
precision
13.  Followers will then respond under the conjectural variation assumption of 
Cournot behavior.  Similar implications follow under the alternative behavior motive that 
firms are acting to influence the tradeoff between operating efficiency and competitive 
advantage via disclosure (e.g., Board (2003), Ozbilgin and Penno (2003)).  In either case, if 
the major incentive for a Stackelberg leader is to either reduce information risk or protect 
competitive advantage, the leader will attempt to exploit the externalities in the game at the 
expense of the followers.  Under this hypothesis, pre regulation, a Stackelberg leader exploits 
the externalities for self interest as opposed to social welfare interest.   Post regulation, the 
Stackelberg equilibrium is broken up because the regulators reduce the power of the leader 
when motivated by “social welfare” as opposed to “self interest.”  This results in predicted 
re-distributive effects between leader and follower firms in the economy or sector.  The 
                                                 
13 As suggested from the analysis by Easley and O’Hara (2004). 
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empirical facts documented by Simon (1989) and Beardsley and O'Brien (2004) suggest that 
if large firms are viewed as leaders, they are worse off  post the disclosure while follower 
firms are better off from a cost of equity capital perspective.   .Similarly, in the analytical 
analysis of a disclosure game motivated by operational efficiency/competitive advantage 
tradeoffs, by Ozbilgin and Penno (2003), the leader again attempts to make themselves 
strictly better off this time by disguising information.  That is, the leader adds noise by 
employing a mixed strategy.  The mandated disclosure condition serves to enhance 
operational transparency which can reduce the profitability of the leader.  
 
In addition, the comparative advantage of the market leader in terms of greater 
analyst and press coverage is neutralized under guidelines for the dissemination of price 
sensitive information. Under The PSI Guide
14, the FSA warns analysts that, “while they are 
not subject to the listing rules, eliciting the dissemination of price sensitive information may 
leave them open to an FSA investigation of their conduct under separate FSA powers”. The 
FSA also notes
15 that “relationships with the press and other media, though often 
contributing to a well informed market, need particularly careful management in instances 
where potentially price sensitive information is involved”. 
 
In summary, under the Stackelberg leader game interpretation mandated disclosure is 
predicted to reduce the power of the Stackelberg leader resulting in the leader being worse 
off and some of the followers being better off post the regulation.  Aggregate impact, 
therefore, is an empirical issue that depends upon the net of the redistributive effects.  In 
this paper, we test this hypothesis using the UK data as discussed next.  
                                                 
14 Appendix 2: The PSI Guide – The UKLA’s guidance on the dissemination of price sensitive information, 
Section 11 
15 Ibid. Section 15 
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Empirical Implications for Capital Markets 
 
The analytical and empirical literature reviewed above provides testable implications 
relative to stated regulatory objectives in terms of the direction and impact of a shift in the 
disclosure threshold.  Predictions differ depending upon whether or not we consider the 
regulation in conjunction with potential externalities created among firms.  In the first strand 
of literature the regulation is predicted to have a positive impact relative to stated regulatory 
objectives because increases the predicted precision of disclosure shift the voluntary disclosure 
threshold to the right and reduce systematic risk.  The second strand of the literature 
examines a more general question which is impact upon social welfare and now the predicted 
impact can be either positive or negative. 
  
To test the insights from each strand we state our hypotheses next.  The shift in the 
voluntary disclosure threshold is an implication from proposition 3, Jung and Kwon (1988) 
and corollary 2, Verrecchia (1990). We interpret this as being consistent with the regulatory 
objective of “market confidence” because increases in systematic risk reduce market 
confidence and vice versa.  As a result, our first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
 Hypothesis I 
 
The disclosure threshold is predicted to shift to the right post versus pre the 
regulatory event.   
 
Support for this hypothesis follows because, although investors still form 
assessments about the manager possessing private information, the precision of investors’ 
prior information increases and similarly the overall likelihood of managers being in 
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possession of private information is reduced.   Formally, this follows from Proposition 2 of 
Jung and Kwon (1988) and Corollary 2, Verrecchia (1990).  
 
The first Hypothesis will be tested across the four sectors targeted by the FSA 
regulation after controlling for general market movements pre and post the regulation
16. 
Externalities:  Sector Risk Implications 
 
The second strand of the literature, reviewed above, analyzes social welfare 
implications via by considering the impact of externalities which are ignored in Hypothesis 1.  
As identified in the literature it is possible that regulation, in the presence of significant 
externalities, can make the economy worse off.  The insights from this strand of the 
literature analyze directly the potential impact of regulation on social welfare when the 
impact of regulation upon the disclosure game among firms is analyzed.  Existing analytical 
results in the literature are consistent with the prediction that regulation can work both ways.  
Regulation can both promote and harm social welfare.  From the Admati and Pfleiderer 
(2000) analysis, it is more likely to promote social welfare when correlations among firms are 
high.   The reason, in Admati and Pfleiderer’s economy, is that imposing a minimal precision 
level upon the economy can force a more cost effective firm to increase disclosure precision 
and a less cost effective firm to reduce the disclosure precision, relative to the unregulated 
Nash equilibrium.  In this way the regulator is able to attain higher aggregate gains for the 
economy even though there are re-distributive effects at the individual firm levels.  Similarly, 
in the literature on protecting competitive advantage mandated disclosure serves to enhance 
the operational efficiency of the previously less informed firm.  As a result, as observed by 
                                                 
16 A shift in the threshold is interpreted relative to stated regulatory objectives as opposed to attempting to 
provide any deeper “social welfare” interpretation. 
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Dye (2001)
17 benefits to a non disclosing firm arise when disclosure would otherwise result 
in positive covariance in outputs.  In this context, however, mandated disclosure would 
promote competition and result in aggregate profits declining.  As a result, viewed from a 
firm profitability perspective we again predict the existence of redistributive effects.  If these 
redistributive effects are consistent with the stated objective of the regulation of promoting 
market confidence, they will trigger a decline in correlations among firms which implies a 
reduction in industry level systematic risk.   
By targeting a specific industry the FSA regulation is consistent with the insights 
from this second strand of the literature because this implies higher correlations relative to 
the economy at large.  The following testable implication follows.  Relative to the stated 
regulatory objective, by mandating higher levels of minimal disclosure precision to the sector 
a desirable re-distributive effect is for correlations among firms within the sector to reduce.  
That is, because re-distributive effects make some firms strictly worse off and some strictly 
better off relative to unregulated Nash equilibrium, and therefore correlations among returns 
will change.  If correlations increase for the sector as a whole, then sector (i.e., systematic) 
risk increases.  If correlations decrease for the sector as a whole, then sector risk decreases.  
Under the stated regulatory objectives from the FSA, the desirable change is for the FSA 
regulation to trigger re-distributive effects that reduce correlations.  When pre-regulation is 
contrasted with post-regulation periods to the extent that desirable re-distributive effects are 
being triggered in response to externalities then correlations among firms within the sector 
will fall.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Footnote 58 of the disclosure essay. 




Relative to stated regulatory objectives, correlations post FSA regulation are lower 
than pre FSA regulation. 
 
Our second Hypothesis is not designed to test whether social welfare has been 
increased but rather whether regulation has an impact upon market confidence via its 
influence upon return correlations.   This will provide evidence that externalities, as 
identified in the second strand of the literature, have a significant presence.  In addition, 
when viewed in conjunction with the results from Hypothesis 1, an argument in support of 
improvement can be made if the overall evidence is consistent with a shift of the threshold 
to the right even in the presence of externalities.   We turn to gaining a better understanding of this 
issue next. 
Externalities:  Firm Specific Risk Implications 
 
The objective for this section is to identify what re-distributive effects occurred when 
examining behavior at the individual firm level, pre versus post the FSA regulation.  Our 
third major hypothesis focuses upon the redistributive effects at an individual firm level.  In 
the presence of a Stackelberg leader, the post FSA regulation results in offsetting shifts in the 
voluntary disclosure thresholds at an individual firm level for leaders versus followers.  For 
leaders the threshold shift is predicted to be to the left (i.e., precision of the investors’ priors 
reduces) and for followers the threshold shift can be in either direction.  The aggregate of 
the individual firm threshold shifts, however, is predicted to be to the right if consistent with 
stated regulatory objectives.  As a result, in hypothesis we study behavior at the individual 
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level in an attempt to shed light on the sector level results identified from testing hypothesis 
I. Hypothesis III is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis III 
 
In the presence of a Stackelberg leader, the post FSA regulation results in 
redistributive effects that are observable as offsetting shifts in the voluntary disclosure 
thresholds at an individual firm level for leaders versus followers.  For leaders the threshold 
shift is to the left (i.e., precision of the investors’ priors reduces) and for followers the 
threshold shift is predominately to the right (i.e., investors’ priors increase). 
 
In the next section we first provide an overview of the methodology, designed to 
test hypotheses I and III, followed by the technical details. 
Section V: Methodology:   
 
Consider an event that is defined as the passing of regulation that increases 
expected mandatory disclosure.  That is, the regulation event combines penalties with 
increased disclosure obligations. Because mandated disclosure changes the incentives for 
voluntary disclosure we predict an event of this nature will have redistributive effects.  
Our goal is to measure these redistributive effects by measuring the impact of the event 
upon the voluntary disclosure threshold.  The voluntary disclosure threshold is, for 
reasons developed in this section, the measurable consequence of the impact of the 
event upon investor expectations. 
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Consider the risk neutralized asset price process both before and after an event 
of interest.  Suppose this process is governed by an Ito Process where the volatility 
function can be different for pre versus post the event: 
 
dW t P rdt P DP e ) , ( / Pr σ + =         ( 1 )  
 
dW t P rdt P DP Post ) , ( / σ + =         ( 2 )  
 
In the above equations P is the price of the asset, r is risk neutralized drift and 
σPre(P,t) is the volatility function pre the event and similarly for post.  Finally, W for t>0 
W(t) is a standard normally distributed random variable mean 0, variance t. 
 
If the econometrician knows the volatility function the probability distribution of 
the risk neutralized value of the underlying asset at the end of any time period of time T 
can be computed.  For example, in the well known Black and Scholes (1973) model 
volatility is constant and the lognormal distribution of prices is implied. 
 
The distributions that can be constructed from the pair of risk neutralized 
processes above, prior to and post the event in question, are directly comparable in 
terms of second order stochastic dominance because the first moment drops out and 
therefore the two distributions satisfy the mean preserving spread condition identified by 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)  in their work on stochastic dominance of the second 
degree.  Therefore, the impact of the event upon the shift in the threshold can be 
measured by invoking proposition 3 Jung and Kwon (1988).  In particular, this 
proposition relates second-order stochastic dominance to the shift in the threshold.   
Further, as remarked by Jung and Kwon, this proposition can be interpreted in terms of 
investors’ revision of prior beliefs.  In other words, it identifies a measurable property of 
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a shift in investors’ unobservable expectations.  In the methodology described in this 
section it is this property that we exploit in our empirical analysis. 
 
This theory however depends upon the econometrician being able to observe the 
volatility function pre and post the event.  Next we consider the case where the 
econometrician cannot directly observe the volatility function but instead must estimate 
this function. 
 
There are basically three techniques that can be employed to resolve this 
problem.  Each of the techniques depends upon a well known proposition on equivalent 
martingale measures that can be traced back to Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Harrison 
and Pliska (1981). Here positive state prices and equivalent martingale measures (i.e., risk 
neutral probabilities) are implied from arbitrage free prices.  
 
As a result, each technique starts with observed prices and the assumption of the 
absence of arbitrage to infer risk neutral probabilities.  Then given the risk neutralized 
probabilities the risk neutralized distribution of prices can be computed at the end of any 
period of time T.  Examples of these three techniques are provided respectively by 
Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996), Stutzer (1996) and Luenberger (1998). In this paper we 
adopt Luenberger’s approach applied by Winston (1999) to value stock and real options. 
 
We implement this approach in the same way as Stutzer (1996).  The major 
difference is that Stutzer applies the axioms of entropy to first recover a single set of risk 
neutral probabilities from observed prices.  In our implementation we replace the axioms 
of entropy with the assumption of a logarithmic utility function to recover a single set of 
risk neutral probabilities. The Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) approach is not 
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employed because it requires data on option prices that are not available for our problem 
at hand. 
 
Our starting point therefore is the underlying asset’s historical time series of 
prices one year prior to the event of interest and one year post the event of interest.  
Following Stutzer (1996) we construct what he refers to as the empirical return 
distribution by assuming that each day’s realized return is equally likely. 
 
In our case we construct the log optimal portfolio consisting of the risky and 
risk-free assets with respect to the empirical distribution.  The log optimal portfolio 
maximizes the expected utility of an investor with logarithmic utility function (U(x) = 
ln(x)).  Support for this utility function comes from the number of realistic real world 
implications as suggested by Luenberger (1998) and others ((Brown (1987), Kelly (1956), 
Latane (1959), Luenberger (1993))  
 
In order to test our hypotheses at both sector and individual firm levels we 
construct log optimal portfolios subject to additional sensitivity constraints.  For the case 
of our analysis at the sector level the log optimal portfolio is constructed to have zero 
sensitivity (i.e., zero factor loading) with respect to aggregate market behavior.  For the 
case of individual firm behavior we construct the log optimal portfolio to have zero 
sensitivity to both aggregate market and sector level behavior.  We do this by 
constructing the log optimal portfolio using returns that have been adjusted for general 
market (and if relevant) sector returns using a standard market model. 
 
From the log optimal portfolio the state prices can be recovered directly under 
the assumption that observed prices are arbitrage free.  The state prices exist under the 
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assumption that prices are arbitrage free and thus can be normalized to recover the risk 
neutral probabilities. The state in this theory is defined as a return.  So now we have 
transformed the empirical probabilities associated with observed daily returns into the 
equivalent risk neutralized probabilities associated with each return under the assumption 
that the representative investor in the economy has preferences that can be described by 
a logarithmic utility function. 
 
Having estimated the risk neutralized probabilities the implied risk neutral 
distribution for the asset price, at the end of the T period of time, is calculated directly by 
employing Monte Carlo simulation.  This permits a large number of daily return 
sequences to be generated from the risk neutralized probabilities over a given time 
period.  Each sequence results in a terminal value for the asset price P and hence the set 
of all sequences results in the distribution.  That is, the risk neutralized terminal price 
distribution, subject to the constraints imposed, has been recovered numerically. 
 
Numerical techniques of this nature are commonly applied to value options 
when Monte Carlo simulation techniques are employed, but in the current case we are 
applying the method to recovery the volatility function of the risk neutralized asset 
process both immediately before and after the event of interest.  This permits the testing 
whether or not predicted second order stochastic dominance effects are observed. 
 
In addition, because the first moment of the risk neutralized distribution of 
prices drops out this provides an additional important control.  The economic impact of 
the event is captured in terms of its impact within a “pure exchange” economy to the 
extent that production effects impact the first moment of the price distribution.  As a 
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result, we analyze a setting that is very close to what has been extensively analyzed 
analytically in the traditional voluntary disclosure literature.   
 
Technical Details Supporting the Methodology:   
 
We recover the risk-neutral probabilities directly from the implied set of state 
prices constructed from log-optimal returns.  The log-optimal return R* is defined as the 
return that is optimal for an expected utility maximizing investor with preferences that 
can be represented by a logarithmic utility function.  Under this preference assumption 






E λ = ) (
*           ( 3 )  
 
Where expectations are defined with respect to the real world (empirical 
probabilities) and di is the payoff from security i, λ is the Lagrange multiplier and Pi is the 
price of security i. 
 
Now consider the log optimal portfolio that is constructed by allocating $1 to the 
risky asset and the risk free asset.  That is, suppose some proportion α is allocated to the 
risky asset and 1-α to the risk free security.  Alpha is chosen to maximize expected utility 
given a logarithmic utility function
18.  We will refer to this portfolio as a log optimal 
portfolio and let its expected return be R*.  In addition, because the above necessary 
condition holds for every security i, it is also valid for this log-optimal portfolio itself and 
therefore the Lagrangian multiplier must equal 1 because the price is 1.  This implies that 
                                                 
18 On the rare occasion that wealth becomes negative in the log optimal portfolio following Winston (1999) we 
bound utility from below by -100000. 
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the simple log-optimal pricing equation satisfied by the price P, of any security (or 






E P=           ( 4 )  
 
Our goal, however, is to recover the risk neutral pricing relationship from this 
log optimal pricing relationship.  We do this by constructing and normalizing the state 
prices implied from the logarithmic utility function.  States are defined in terms of 
returns and positive state prices exist under our assumption that prices are arbitrage free. 






x U p ) ( * '
= Ψ          ( 5 )  
 
In the above equation s is the state, p is the empirical (real world) probability 
associated with the state and x
* the payoff from the optimal portfolio choice problem. 
For our current example, x
* is the payoff from the log optimal portfolio, λ equals 1 and 
the marginal utility equals 1/x
*. 
 
To convert into a (risk neutralized) probability we scale state prices so that they 















π          ( 6 )  
 
Finally, we employ Monte Carlo simulation techniques by generating a sequence 
of return realizations from the risk neutral probabilities.  Each sequence when applied to 
the beginning of period price results in a single terminal price at the end of the period.  
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The set of all sequences from the simulation results in the numerical estimate of the risk 
neutralized distribution of prices.  In this paper we estimate the risk neutralized 
distribution of prices from 100,000 sequences. With 100,000 observations for all 
practical purposes this is an estimate of the population distribution and therefore small 
shifts in the distribution are highly significant.  However, to measure the relative 
significance of the shift we estimate the non parametric Chi-Square statistic and test the 
null hypothesis of no shift. The Chi-Square test is applied as follows.  First, 100 bins 
were defined relative to the pre-event distribution.  This defined the expected 
frequencies under the null hypothesis.  The observed frequencies (for the same set of 
bins) from the post event distribution defined the observed frequencies.  A standard chi 
square statistic is then computed to test the null hypothesis of no difference pre versus 
post lognormal distributions. 
 
Section VI: Results 
 
The goal of our empirical tests is to measure the impact of the regulation upon the 
financial sector. We broadly interpret these objectives as serving to influence investor 
expectations in a manner that is consistent with an increase in the perceived disclosure 
precision for the financial sector and similarly reduced financial sector (i.e. systematic)  risk. 
As a result, in this section, we provide the results of our tests of the hypotheses developed 
from the related theoretical literature and methodology discussed in the previous sections.   
To focus on the impact upon the financial sector we control for general market movements 
over the time period from pre and post the FSA regulation by using a broad based index that 
is representative of general economy wide movements and is not dominated by the financial 
sector.  For this purpose we selected the FTSE All Share Index, a broadly diversified index 
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that is widely regarded as a benchmark for UK pension fund investment in shares of 
companies in the UK.  
 
We first test the Hypothesis that that the risk neutralized distribution pre and post 
the event, is lognormal which is consistent with price changes satisfying weak form market 
efficiency.  That is, it is consistent with the weak form market efficient assumption in the 
Black-Scholes world.  
Test of the assumption that prices are arbitrage free 
 
For the two time periods 1-year pre and post the FSA regulation we found that for 
each financial market sector the null hypothesis of consistency with the lognormal 
distribution could not be rejected.   Supporting results from testing these assumptions are 
provided in Appendix A.   
 
Given that the assumption of arbitrage free price changes cannot be rejected we 
consider next the stochastic dominance behavior of the risk neutralized return distributions 
from which we can draw conclusions regarding the impact of the regulation upon the shift in 
the disclosure threshold. 
Risk Neutralized Return Distribution Analysis 
 
By equating the means for the before and after risk neutralized return distribution to 
the average of the first moments over the combined period, we test for stochastic 
dominance from the implied single crossing condition as discussed in the methodology 
section.  For the lognormal distribution this is equivalent to testing for the effect of whether 
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the FSA regulation was associated with an increase in investors’ assessment of the disclosure 
precision for the sector when contrasting pre versus post November 30, 2001. 
A.  Graphs of Stochastic Dominance Effects Implied from FSA 
 
In the following results section we provide the dominance relationship below each 
graph.  Two periods of time are considered:  one year prior to November 30, 2001, and 1-
year after are compared and correspond to T-1, T as labeled and depicted as dashed for pre 
and solid for post.. For comparison purposes each graph is provided with its domain scaled 
to equal the mean plus/minus two times the average volatility.  Recall that for the four 
sectors affected two sectors, Banks and General Insurance were previously regulated by 
Governmental bodies and the other two sectors Investments and Life Insurance were self 
regulated sectors. 
 
We provide tables of results in Appendix B.  Below for each graph we indicate the 
dominance relationship as > implying the shift is to the right for the threshold (and 
therefore to the right in the region below the single crossing point and to the left above the 
single crossing point).  The Chi-Square statistic is computed to test the Hypothesis of no 
shift in the distribution from T versus T-1
19. 
 
Post FSA dominates pre FSA for Banking, Insurance and Investment sectors as we 
move from pre to post November 30, 2001 (as depicted in Figures 1 to 3). Pre FSA 
dominates post FSA for the Life sector. 
                                                 
19 The Chi-Square test is applied as follows.  First, 100 bins were defined relative to the pre-event distribution 
using the numerically estimated moments.  This defined the expected frequencies under the null hypothesis.  
The observed frequencies (for the same set of bins) from the post event distribution defined the observed 
frequencies.  A standard chi square statistic is then computed to test the null hypothesis of no difference pre 
versus post distributions. 
 




Figure 1: F egulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for FABANK  SA R
 
































Dominance relationship:  T-1 < T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 2344.35 (T vrs T-1). 
 
Figure 2:  Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for FAINU   FSA
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Dominance relationship:  T-1 < T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 5502.29 (T vrs T-1). 
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Figure 3  Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution of FAINVC  : FSA
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Dominance relationship:  T-1 < T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 11235.79 (T vrs T-1). 
 
Figure 4:   Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for FALIFE  FSA
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Dominance relationship:  T-1 > T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 23174.98 (T vrs T-1). 
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To better understand the nature of the dominance relationships, we first consider the 
impact that externalities among firms can have on the above results.  
Role of Externalities:  Sector Risk Implications 
 
Our test of the Hypothesis II is designed to ascertain whether return behavior is 
consistent with the presence of externalities and the FSA regulation having a desirable re-
distributive impact upon the financial sector relative to its stated objectives.  In addition, 
when viewed in conjunction with the results from Hypothesis I a stronger argument can be 
made in support of meeting regulatory objectives if the overall evidence is consistent with a 
shift of the threshold to the right even in the presence of externalities.   
 
To test Hypothesis II we conduct a factor analysis of the major companies in each 
sector to isolate the impact of firm specific drivers upon the post regulation sector level 
behavior.  We analyze the firm specific return variance, adjusted for both general market and 
general sector movements, to isolate the effects of reaction function interdependencies that 
may drive observed shifts in the threshold for the sector as a whole.   Finally, we note that 
the investment sector consists of a large number of small firms and so is potentially different 
from the other sectors from an industrial organization perspective.  As a result, we analyze 
only those Investment firms that are 2% and higher to detect any interdependencies that 
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Pre FSA Factor Analysis of Hypothesis 2 
 
We perform both principal component and rotated factor analysis on the pre and 
post daily return data adjusted for general market and general sector movements
20.   Rotated 
factors when compared to principal components permit the sectors to be more sharply 
focused upon because we do expect correlations to exist among the sub-sectors of the 
general financial sector.  We report both un-rotated and rotated factors loadings to observe 
these effects.   
 
In the analysis of the pre FSA returns, five principal components were identified 
with eigenvalues greater than 1 and cumulative variance explanation equaled 83.19% (see 
Appendix C).   The relative proportions of this cumulative percentage are provided in 
Appendix C for both un-rotated and rotated factors.  Essentially the rotation permits factors 
2 to 5 to explain relative more variance by reducing the percentage of explained variance for 
factor 1 from 51.96% (un-rotated) to 41.32% (rotated).  This also permits the factor loadings 
to be sharpened across factors which in turn sharpen factor descriptions. 
 
It is interesting that the first factor has all firms from Banks, Insurance Life, 
Insurance General loading highly but with all investment firms not loading (regardless of 
whether we consider un-rotated or rotated factors).  The factor analysis has immediately 
sharply discriminated between Banks and Insurance versus Investments pre the FSA. (see 
Appendix D ‘Factor Loading Tables’).  In the principal component analysis the investment 
sector loaded on factor 2.  This is consistent with the substantially different industrial 
organization that characterizes this subset of the general financial sector.  In addition, all 
                                                 
20  We consider only factors with eigenvalues above 1 and we use the Varimax technique was used for the 
rotation method. 
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factor loadings are positive on these two factors with the exception of the 3iGroup within 
the Investment sector.  Within the Investor sector there appear to be two sub-sectors - the 
3iGroup versus the rest.  It is interesting to note that fundamentals support this because the 
3iGroup deals primarily as a venture capitalist whereas the other firms primarily manage 
portfolios of securities trading on the secondary exchanges.  
 
In addition across the remaining five factors from the pre FSA period, factor 
loadings for each factor identify precisely a subset of firms coinciding with each sector.  For 
the rotated factor results, Factor 2 consists of General Insurance, Factor 3 consists of the 
Investment firms, factor 4 Life Insurance and factor 5 a sub relationship within the 
investment sector.   That is, the investment sector really consists of two sub sectors.  It is 
interesting to note that these relationships occur after adjusting for both general market and 
sector effects.  The correlations exist from firm specific drivers, which we interpret as firm 
specific reaction functions relevant to the disclosure game. Next, we identify what re-
distributive effects happened pre versus post the FSA regulation in the presence of these 
interdependencies. 
Pre versus Post FSA Regulation 
 
The results of the post FSA factor analysis provide a striking contrast to the analysis 
of pre FSA.  Overall, there was a large reduction in the extent of within sector correlations.  
First, applying the same cutoff criteria the number of factors increased from five to 10.  
Total explained variance reduced from 83.19% to 38.94% for the first five factors and to 
62.83% for the ten factors (see Appendix E).   No individual factor explained more than 
11% of the variance which is consistent with the overall conclusion that post FSA within 
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sector correlations were reduced.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 2.  In addition, when 
combined with the results from testing Hypothesis 1, it is consistent with the regulation 
having an overall positive impact even though it is likely to have resulted in re-distributive 
effects at the individual firm level. 
 
A closer examination of the post FSA factors, and especially the larger first five 
factors reveals the following interesting patterns.   Factor 1 captures sharply the General 
Insurance sector (Appendix F).  Rotated, this factor reveals that Royal Sun has a large 
negative factor loading while the other firms in this sector have large positive loadings 
(Appendix G).  Relative size information is provided for each sector in Appendix H and the 
largest firm in the sector has a negative loading (or at least an opposite loading).  Similarly, 
factor two identifies the Life Insurance sector reveals the same pattern.   The largest firm has 
a negative loading and the next two largest firms have large positive loadings (no other firms 
load on this factor from any sector).   Factor 3 identifies the 3iGroup with a large negative 
loading and the other three large positive loadings are also from the Investment sector.  We 
note, however, that this pattern is unchanged from pre to post FSA regulation unlike the 
factors relevant to the other sectors.  Finally, factor 4 identifies the largest bank with a 
negative loading plus one of the smaller banks.  Other banks loaded positively but lacked 
large loadings. 
 
The above results have identified that with the exception of the Investment sector 
that different behavior appears to be exhibited by the largest firm in each sector relative to 
other firms.  In order to explore this further we conduct a test of Hypothesis III, by 
providing an analysis of the shift in the thresholds for individual firms (adjusted for both 
general market and sector movements).   For each sector, with the exception of Investments, 
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a highly significant left shift in the voluntary disclosure threshold was observed for the largest 
firm.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 3 that if the disclosure game has a Stackelberg 
leader then the regulation will have the predicted effect of making the leader worse off and 
the followers better off.  In the following sections we analyze the behavior of each sector 
from this perspective in more detail. 
 
Interpretation of the Disclosure Games:  Life Insurance 
 
The Life Insurance sector is dominated by a large firm AVIVA (33.7%) and from  
pre FSA to post FSA AVIVA’s threshold moved sharply to the left as depicted below.    
Figure 5 FSA Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for AVIVA 




























Pre Hdash L vrs Post Hsolid L
AVIVA
 
Dominance relationship:  T-1 > T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 56251.50 (T vrs T-1). 
 
From the factor analysis results in Appendix C, pre FSA factor loadings for AVIVA 
on both the general factor (component 1) and the Life Insurance factor (component 4) are 
similar to the other Life Companies.  However, post FSA AVIVA’s weights are quite 
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different.  In particular, on rotated factor 2 post FSA (appendix D) it is only the three Life 
Companies that have the large loading and AVIVA has a large negative loading (-0.920).  On 
this same factor the remaining large loads are the other Life companies which have positive 
loadings (Legal and General 0.54, Prudential 0.75).   These three firms make up the majority 
of the Life Insurance sector and AVIVA,  Prudential and Legal and General account for 
33.7%, 25.7% and 19.6% respectively (cumulative equals 79%).  From the individual analysis 
at an individual firm level the voluntary disclosure threshold for both Prudential and Legal & 
General, moved sharply to the right post the FSA regulation. 
 
Figure 6: FSA Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for Prudential 
































Dominance relationship:  T-1 < T.  







  38ISMA Centre Discussion Papers in Finance DP2004-12 
 
Figure 7: FSA Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for Legal & General 
































Dominance relationship:  T-1 < T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 3453.73 (T vrs T-1). 
 
This is consistent with the hypothesized interpretation of the disclosure game played 
out among these three firms.  In addition, it is clear that AVIVA experienced the relatively 
stronger shift than Prudential and Legal and General combined.  From table 3, Appendix I 
AVIVA’s volatility increased by 30% whereas both Prudential and Legal & General declined 
by 14% and 14.5% respectively
21.  Post the FSA regulation we are detecting a shift in 
investor expectations that is consistent with the precision of investor priors decreasing for 
AVIVA.  At the same time investor expectations are consistent with the precision of 
investors’ priors increasing for both Prudential and Legal & General.  Overall, for the sector 
as whole the left shift from AVIVA dominates the right shifts from Prudential and Legal & 
General, resulting in an overall left shift observed for this sector when testing Hypothesis I. 
                                                 
21 Volatility under CAPM is not a driver of cost of equity capital but as a result of the “beta debate” in CAPM 
which questions the association between beta and expected return, and therefore beta and cost of capital, 
empirically volatility is considered to be a driver.  This is reinforced if equity is considered to be an option 
defined on the total assets of the firm. 
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All the remaining sectors resulted in a positive shift and these sectors are analyzed 
next. 
Interpretation of the Disclosure Games:  General Insurance 
 
This sector was consistent with Hypothesis I.   Appendix H reveals that this sector is 
dominated by a large firm Royal Sun (29.9%), followed by Jardine, Britins, Amlin, 
Wellington and Hiscox (14.1%, 12.1%, 8.0%, 7.6% and 7.1% respectively).  From the 
individual analysis in Appendix I Table 2 we observe that dramatic shifts of the threshold 
were realized at the individual firm level for this sector.  Again the largest firm, Royal Sun, 
shifted sharply to the left as did Britins.    
Figure 8: FSA Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for Royal Sun 
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Royal Sun
 
Dominance relationship:  T-1 > T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 228,867 (T vrs T-1). 
 
For this sector the offsetting right shifts were realized from the subset of relatively 
smaller firms, Amlin, Wellington and Hiscox, see Table 2, Appendix I.  Post the FSA 
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regulation for Amlin, Wellington and Hiscox the evidence is consistent with investors’ 
expecting more voluntary disclose (so the precision of investor priors increase) and less 
voluntary disclosure from Royal Sun and Britins.  For the case of Jardine a weak shift to the 
right was observed so it was basically left unaffected.   Jardine’s factor loading behavior post 
the FSA regulation is also consistent with this interpretation. 
 
Offsetting this, however, were equally and larger shifts to the right by Amlin, 
Wellington and Hiscox.  For the case of Hiscox volatility declined by 87% and the shift was 
as follows: 
Figure 9: FSA Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for Hiscox 
































Dominance relationship:  T-1 < T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 213,954 (T vrs T-1). 
 
In summary this sector breaks down into two subsets of firms (relative large) which 
behave in a manner that is consistent with Hypothesis 3 and the relatively smaller which also 
behave in a manner consistent with Hypothesis 3.  The overall positive impact upon the 
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sectors is consistent with the relatively smaller sector’s positive shifts dominating the 
negative impact from the relatively larger set of firms.  
Interpretation of the Disclosure Games:  Banks 
 
Overall this sector was consistent with Hypothesis I.   This sector is dominated by 
HSBC (32.7%), followed by RBOS, HBOS, Barclays, Lloyds, and Standard Charter (21.3%, 
12.7%, 12.5%, 10.5% and 3.7% respectively).  Significant shifts were observed at the 
individual firm level.  Again the largest bank shifted significantly to the left and the second 
largest RBOS exhibited a sharp offsetting shift to the right.  In addition, at the relatively 
smaller bank level, shifts were all to the right.  As a result, Banks behaved similarly with the 
largest firm exhibiting a strong left shift and the rest of the sector counteracting with right 
shifts (see Table 1, Appendix I). 
Figure 10: FSA Regulation - Pre versus post cumulative return distribution for HSBC 




























Pre Hdash L vrs Post Hsolid L
HSBC
 
Dominance relationship:  T-1 > T.  
Chi-Square Statistics 69,543 (T vrs T-1). 
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Some Conclusions from the Banks, General Insurance and Life Insurance 
 
The above analysis supports the following immediate conclusions.  The disclosure 
game is consistent with Hypothesis III, which argues that the disclosure game empirically 
appears to be characterized by a Stackelberg leader exploiting the externalities to reduce their 
own cost of capital.  The FSA regulation serves to break up the leader’s power which alters 
the reactions of the Cournot followers in this game to disclose more.  Investors’ 
expectations are consistent with the implication that the relative largest entity in each of 
these sectors is expected to disclose less voluntarily after the FSA regulation and their cost of 
capital increases.  This in turn triggers re-distributive effects among the other entities in the 
sector in the presence of externalities. 
At the aggregate sector level to be consistent with stated regulatory objectives the left 
shift exhibited by the leader should be more than offset by the aggregate movements of the 
remaining firms.  This was indeed the case for both Banks and General Insurance but not 
the case for Life Insurance companies.  For the latter the offsetting reactions from the 
remaining firms in the sector and especially Prudential and Legal & General were not 
sufficient to counteract the left shift experienced by AVIVA. 
Interpretation of the Disclosure Games:  Investments 
 
This sector is different from the other three sectors.  The results from the factor 
analysis immediately identified this difference because pre FSA regulation the other three 
sectors all loaded strongly on the first factor and no firm from this sector loaded on this 
factor.  The industrial organization of this sector is very different because it consists of a 
very large number of smaller firms.  Therefore, considering the disclosure game in terms of a 
Stackelberg leader is less reasonable than is the case for the other three sectors.   
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In addition, the factor analysis suggests that there are really two sub-sectors in this 
sector because consistently the largest firm, 3iGroup (13% of the sector) loaded in a 
different way from the others both pre and post.  From the fundamentals a case can be 
made for this representation identified by the factor analysis.  This is because 3iGroup is in 
the business of Venture Capital whereas the remaining firms manage investment portfolios.  
For the remaining firms we examine all firms that are at least 2% of the combined 
Investments sector (see Appendix H). 
 
First, for the largest 3iGroup the threshold shift was pronounced, and to the right, 
post the FSA regulation.   That is, 3iGroup is strictly better off. 
 
For the remaining firms in the investment segment the pattern that emerged is as 
follows.  The largest firm is Foreign Colonial, followed by Alliance Trust, Witan and Scottish 
Mortgage.  Again the largest, Foreign Colonial shifted to the left and Alliance Trust shifted 
in the offsetting direction to the right.   But thereafter, shifts appeared to be approximately 
alternating for the remaining set.  Therefore, the significant positive impact upon the 
Investment sector is likely to have been driven more by the venture capital sector as opposed 
to any pronounced impact either way for the remaining firms in the Investment sector (see 
Table 4, Appendix I). 
 
Section VII: Conclusions 
 
Overall the FSA regulation appears to have had an expected positive impact relative 
to stated regulatory objectives because in three out of four sectors the overall shift in the 
disclosure threshold was to the right.  The transition from a regulatory system of “a subtle 
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blend of self regulation and statute” Miles (1992) to one of integrated regulation has been 
successful in meeting the FSA’s stated objectives. The exception was Life Insurance.  A right 
shift is consistent with a reduction in sector risk and cost of equity capital for the sector.  
Such a right shift in the disclosure threshold is the predicted result of an increase in 
investors’ prior precision and therefore, a reduction in the information risk component of 
the cost of capital (e.g., Easley and O'Hara (2004)).  
 
At a micro level, however, the introduction of the regulation has re-distributive 
effects among the major firms in each sector.  Here the main hypothesis tested was 
motivated from empirical insights from the US in relation to the passing of the 1933/1934 
Securities Acts (e.g. Simon (1989)) and the introduction of Regulation FD/Sarbanes-Oxley 
almost 70-years later.  The hypothesis was that the disclosure game in the US appeared to be 
consistent with the assumption that larger firms exploit their access advantage to channels of 
voluntary communication.  We analyzed predictions for a disclosure game in the UK where 
we hypothesized that large firms exploit communication channels and externalities for self 
interest, by playing the role of a Stackelberg leader.  Regulators on the other hand attempt to 
exploit the disclosure externalities for social welfare interests.  As a result, post regulation 
under this hypothesis the re-distributive effects are predicted to render larger firms worse off 
and smaller firms better off.  This is because the regulation serves to counteract the strength 
of the Stackelberg leader.   In this paper, we obtain support for this hypothesis for the three 
sub sectors (Banks, General Insurance and Life Insurance) whose industrial organization 
lends itself to this type of game theoretic analysis.   The difference between Banks and 
General Insurance versus Life Insurance was that for the latter, AVIVA, (the leader) the 
disclosure threshold shifted to the left by a greater amount than the remaining firms’ shifted 
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to the right.  As a result, sector level risk (i.e., systematic risk) increased for Life Insurance.  
For Banks and General Insurance, even though the largest firm’s disclosure threshold shifted 
to the left this shift was compensated by greater offsetting shifts to the right for the other 
major entities resulting in a reduction in sector level risk.  Overall, the evidence from these 
sectors was consistent with the hypothesis of the largest firm in each sector being a 
“Stackelberg leader” in each voluntary disclosure game.  
 
Evidence from this paper suggests that the expected positive impact from the FSA 
regulation arises from the redistributive effects that resulted in a general increase in the 
competitiveness of the financial sector due to reduced information risk.  The driver of this 
benefit appears to arise from the regulation serving to “level the playing field” between large 
versus small firm conflicts of interest in the voluntary disclosure game.  This is also 
consistent with existing evidence from the 1933/1934 regulation in the US, which resulted in 
the growth of the Over-the-Counter market post the 1933 Act (Simon 1989). 
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Appendix A: FSA Act and the Financial Sectors 
 
 Lognormal  Estimate     
FSA-Banks Mean  Std  Dev  Chi-Square Probability 
1-Year Pre FSA  10305.40 1534.45  145.3  0.3851 
1-Year Post FSA  8389.53 1106.44 152.4  0.2414 
FSA-Investments  Mean Std  Dev     
1-Year Pre FSA  4040.11 526.18 128.2  0.773 
1-Year Post FSA  3127.61 304.76 175.6  0.7153 
FSA-LIFE  Mean Std  Dev     
1-Year Pre FSA  6832.37 1302.34 142.3  0.4524 
1-Year Post FSA  4116.31 1037.77 143.3  0.431 
FSA-FAINSU  Mean Std  Dev     
1-Year Pre FSA  2140.16 636.75 141.6  0.471 
1-Year Post FSA  1278.64 311.75 112.8  0.9614 
 
Null Hypothesis = Estimated Terminal Value Distribution is Lognormal 
 
Appendix B:  Sector Volatility of Returns and Chi-Squared Test of pre versus post FSA sector 
distribution shift 
 
  Annualized Volatility of Returns 
FSA-Banks All Share  Volatility  Chi-Square 
T-1 0.148  2344.35 
T 0.131   
FSA-INV All Share     
T-1 0.130  11235.79 
T 0.097   
FSA-LIFE All Share     
T-1 0.189  23174.98 
T 0.248   
FSA-FAINSU All Share     
T-1 0.291  5502.29 
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Appendix C:  Factor Analysis of Pre FSA Returns - Principal Component Analysis:   
Explained Variance 
Table 1: Variance Analysis 
Extraction Loadings    Rotation Loadings   
Total  % Variance  Cum %  Total  % Variance  Cum % 
12.989 51.955  51.955  10.330  41.320  41.320 
3.280 13.122 65.077  4.210  16.839  58.160 
2.297 9.189 74.266  2.949  11.797  69.956 
1.205 4.818 79.084  2.194  8.777  78.734 
1.025 4.102 83.186  1.113  4.452  83.186 
 
Table 2: Eigenvalue Analysis 
Components Initial Eigenvalues   
  Total  % Var  Cum %
1  12.989 51.955 51.955 
2 3.280  13.122  65.077 
3 2.297  9.189  74.266 
4 1.205  4.818  79.084 
5 1.025  4.102  83.186 
6 0.801  3.205  86.391 
7 0.757  3.026  89.417 
8 0.721  2.882  92.300 
9 0.611  2.443  94.742 
10 0.549  2.196  96.939 
11 0.472  1.890  98.829 
12 0.293  1.171  100.000
13 0.000  0.000  100.000
14 0.000  0.000  100.000
15 0.000  0.000  100.000
16 0.000  0.000  100.000
17 0.000  0.000  100.000
18 0.000  0.000  100.000
19 0.000  0.000  100.000
20 0.000  0.000  100.000
21 0.000  0.000  100.000
22 0.000  0.000  100.000
23 0.000  0.000  100.000
24 0.000  0.000  100.000
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Appendix D: Factor Loading:  Pre FSA Principal Component and Rotated Factor Analysis 
In the following table the higher factor loadings (0.4 and above) are in bold.  This makes 
the sector differences transparent.  Five factors were identified explaining a cumulative 
of 83.2% of the variance. 
Table 1: Unrotated factor loadings 
Component  Matrix       
Factors  1 2 3 4 5 
Barclays  0.91  -0.20 0.21 -0.23 -0.12 
HBOS  0.93  -0.20 0.20 -0.20 -0.09 
HSBC  0.94  -0.20 0.20 -0.19 -0.07 
Lloyds  0.93  -0.20 0.20 -0.20 -0.09 
Royal  0.88  -0.20 0.21 -0.24 -0.14 
StanChar  0.94  -0.19 0.19 -0.15 -0.04 
Amlin  0.53 0.53 -0.64  -0.07 -0.12 
Britins  0.77  0.39  -0.49  -0.08 -0.08 
Hiscox  0.66 0.47 -0.57  -0.07 -0.10 
Jardine  0.96  0.00 -0.04 -0.08 0.01 
Royal Sun  0.77  0.39  -0.48  -0.08 -0.08 
Wellington  0.94  -0.14 0.13 0.01 0.07 
AVIVA  0.88  0.01 0.00 0.39 0.17 
Britannic  0.96  -0.08 0.08 0.18 0.12 
L & G  0.89  0.00 0.00 0.39 0.17 
Old Mut  0.96  -0.09 0.08 0.17 0.12 
Pru  0.87  0.01 -0.01 0.41  0.18 
3iGroup -0.09  -0.58  -0.34 0.17 0.20 
AllianceTrust 0.01  0.53  0.18 -0.16 0.15 
EdinburghInv 0.05  0.54  0.32 -0.12 -0.09 
ForeignColonial 0.03 0.63  0.38 0.02 0.10 
RITCapital -0.01  0.34  0.12  -0.42 0.68 
SCOTINV 0.04  0.41  0.37 0.33 -0.43 
SCOTMORT 0.01  0.49 0.45 0.15 -0.15 
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Table 2: Rotated Factor Loadings 
 
Component  Matrix       
F a c t o r s  12345  
Barclays   0.97  0.15 0.00 0.01 -0.03 
HBOS   0.98  0.15 0.00 0.05 -0.02 
HSBC   0.98  0.16 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 
Lloyds   0.98  0.15 0.00 0.05 -0.02 
Royal   0.96  0.14 0.00 -0.02  -0.04 
StanChar   0.97  0.16 -0.01 0.12 0.01 
Amlin   0.12  0.98  0.10 0.08 0.01 
Britins   0.42 0.89 0.08 0.15 0.03 
Hiscox   0.28  0.95  0.09 0.12 0.02 
Jardine   0.83 0.42 0.01 0.22 0.04 
Royal Sun   0.43 0.88 0.08 0.15 0.03 
Wellington   0.89  0.20 -0.01 0.31 0.03 
AVIVA   0.65  0.29 0.03 0.67  -0.05 
Britannic   0.83  0.25 0.00 0.49  -0.01 
L & G   0.66  0.29 0.02 0.67  -0.05 
Old Mut   0.83  0.25 0.00 0.48  0.00 
Pru   0.64  0.29 0.03 0.68  -0.06 
3iGroup -0.09  -0.11  -0.69  0.19 0.02 
AllianceTrust -0.05  0.13  0.52  -0.03 0.28 
EdinburghInv 0.04  0.07  0.63  -0.10 0.05 
ForeignColonial -0.03  0.02  0.72  0.09 0.16 
RITCapital -0.01  0.01  0.27  -0.01  0.83 
SCOTINV 0.00  -0.03  0.60  0.09  -0.49 
SCOTMORT 0.00  -0.09  0.67  0.07 -0.15 
WITAN -0.08  0.10  0.61  0.26 0.20 
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Appendix E:  Factor Analysis of Post FSA Returns - Principal Component Analysis:   
Explained Variance 
Table 1: Variance Analysis 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total  % Variance  % Cum  Total % Variance % Cum 
2.630 10.522  10.522  2.281 9.124 9.124 
2.204 8.816  19.338  1.993 7.970  17.094 
1.785 7.141  26.479  1.663 6.652  23.746 
1.577 6.310  32.788  1.558 6.232  29.979 
1.537 6.148  38.936  1.528 6.113  36.092 
1.401 5.604  44.540  1.403 5.612  41.704 
1.301 5.202  49.742  1.352 5.406  47.110 
1.170 4.680  54.422  1.349 5.394  52.504 
1.072 4.289  58.711  1.306 5.223  57.727 
1.029 4.116  62.827  1.275 5.100  62.827 
 
Table 2: Eigenvalue Analysis 
 Initial  Eigenvalues   
Component  Total  % Variance  % Cumulative
1 2.630  10.522  10.522 
2 2.204  8.816  19.338 
3 1.785  7.141  26.479 
4 1.577  6.310  32.788 
5 1.537  6.148  38.936 
6 1.401  5.604  44.540 
7 1.301  5.202  49.742 
8 1.170  4.680  54.422 
9 1.072  4.289  58.711 
10 1.029 4.116  62.827 
11 0.972 3.889  66.716 
12 0.897 3.588  70.303 
13 0.875 3.498  73.802 
14 0.808 3.231  77.032 
15 0.769 3.077  80.109 
16 0.712 2.848  82.957 
17 0.688 2.753  85.710 
18 0.644 2.576  88.287 
19 0.610 2.440  90.727 
20 0.567 2.267  92.994 
21 0.516 2.064  95.058 
22 0.484 1.937  96.995 
23 0.376 1.506  98.501 
24 0.330 1.321  99.822 
25 0.045 0.178  100.000 
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Appendix F: Post FSA Factor Loadings:  Principal Component Analysis 
In the following table the higher loadings per factor are in bold.  This makes the sector 
differences transparent. 
Component  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Barclays    -0.20 -0.12 0.27 -0.11 0.19 0.31 0.26 0.40  0.04 0.22 
HBOS   0.22  0.15  -0.27 -0.09 0.07  -0.68 0.03 -0.01 0.04 0.34 
HSBC    0.35  -0.08 0.15 -0.34 -0.09 0.15 -0.47 -0.11 -0.20 -0.29
Lloyds   -0.35  0.26  -0.05 -0.34 0.17  0.08  0.46  -0.04 0.13 0.03 
Royal   -0.09  -0.06  -0.04 0.73  -0.25 0.03 -0.27 0.08 0.05 -0.08
StanChar   0.27  -0.19  0.26  -0.42 0.08 -0.01 -0.10 -0.20 -0.27 0.04 
Amlin   0.48  0.08 -0.17 0.03 -0.07 0.21 0.12 0.41  0.34 -0.08
Britins   0.54  0.24 -0.19 0.05 -0.31 0.17 0.27 0.10 0.03 0.08 
Hiscox   0.61  -0.09  -0.11 -0.04 0.02 0.09 0.25 0.03 0.16 0.02 
Jardine   0.25  0.01  0.17  0.15  0.49  0.26 0.03 -0.22 -0.18 0.19 
Royal Sun   -0.74  -0.15 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.23 -0.08 0.20 0.10 0.09 
Wellington   0.56  0.06 0.00 0.08 -0.19 -0.15 0.17 -0.21 0.01 0.02 
AVIVA   -0.13  0.83  -0.36 -0.13 0.05 -0.04 -0.16 0.01 -0.08 -0.09
Britannic   0.45  -0.01 0.06 0.08 0.42  -0.14 -0.28 0.14 0.15 0.09 
L & G   0.04  -0.59  0.08 0.36 -0.09 -0.28 0.10 0.13 -0.11 0.01 
Old Mut   -0.03  -0.04  0.01  0.46 0.41 0.41 0.08 -0.24 -0.08 0.18 
Pru   0.04  -0.55 0.42 -0.33 -0.30 0.04 0.14 -0.01 0.20 -0.04
3iGroup -0.33  -0.35  -0.66 -0.14 -0.04 0.26 0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.06 
AllianceTrust -0.01  0.04  0.27  0.04  0.44  -0.23 -0.07 -0.20  0.59  -0.21
EdinburghInv 0.14  0.16  0.30  -0.11 0.15  -0.10 -0.25 0.54  -0.20 0.36 
ForeignColonial 0.02  0.19 0.27 0.19 0.05 -0.30 0.50  0.01  -0.46  -0.13
RITCapital  -0.09 0.33 0.31 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.29 -0.09  -0.56
SCOTINV  -0.08  0.37 0.29 -0.01 -0.32 0.31 -0.22 -0.01 0.10 0.33 
SCOTMORT  0.00  0.21 0.30 0.18 -0.37 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 
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Appendix G: Post FSA Factor Loadings:  Rotated Factor Analysis 
 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 
Barclays    -0.07 0.29 0.02 0.22 0.34 0.16 -0.09 -0.04 0.30 0.41
HBOS   0.10  -0.18  -0.13 0.09 0.04 -0.21 0.14 0.15  -0.74  0.15
HSBC   0.09  -0.04  -0.03 -0.75 -0.16 -0.09 0.01 -0.15 0.17 0.02
Lloyds   -0.11  -0.13  0.03 0.24 0.68 -0.02 0.00 0.07 0.08  -0.11
Royal   -0.06  -0.01  0.14 0.33 -0.73 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 0.13  -0.09
StanChar   0.01  0.20  -0.03 -0.62 0.18 0.08 -0.02 0.07 -0.12  0.09
Amlin   0.66  -0.02 -0.11 0.18 -0.03 -0.15 0.09 -0.19  0.20  0.20
Britins   0.72  -0.11 0.12 0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.21 0.03  -0.04 0.01
Hiscox   0.65  0.15 -0.15 -0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 -0.02 -0.08  0.01
Jardine   0.10  -0.01  -0.04 -0.16 0.05 0.69 0.11 0.08 -0.01  0.11
Royal Sun   -0.69  0.12 -0.01 0.34 0.08 -0.25 -0.01 -0.08  0.00  0.09
Wellington   0.52  0.05 0.11 -0.15 -0.11 0.00 0.06 0.19  -0.26  -0.14
AVIVA   -0.01  -0.92  0.10 0.05 0.15 -0.15 -0.03 0.01 -0.01  0.01
Britannic   0.21  -0.06  -0.21 -0.14 -0.19 0.19 0.43 -0.10 -0.16  0.37
L & G   -0.07  0.54  -0.23 0.15 -0.40 -0.02 -0.05 0.22 -0.14  0.02
Old Mut   -0.03  -0.01  -0.01 0.18 -0.09 0.77 0.00 -0.03 0.11  -0.08
Pru   0.02  0.75  0.12 -0.23 0.16 -0.25 0.03 -0.09 0.11  -0.06
3iGroup -0.18  0.00  -0.43 0.17 0.11 0.01 -0.50 -0.42  -0.04 -0.28
AllianceTrust  -0.09 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.85 -0.06 0.02  -0.10
EdinburghInv -0.04  -0.06  0.09 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.07  -0.05  0.82
ForeignColonial 0.01  0.01  0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 -0.08 0.83  0.00 0.01
RITCapital -0.03  -0.22  -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.11 0.22 0.40 0.62 0.10
SCOTINV 0.01  -0.13  0.68 -0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.12 -0.24 0.09 0.19
SCOTMORT 0.06  0.02  0.47 0.03 -0.19 -0.13 -0.06 0.17 0.08 0.04
WITAN -0.13  0.00  0.75 0.08 0.13 0.04 0.14 0.10 -0.08 -0.16
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Appendix H: Description of sector and major companies analysed within sector 
 
Description of sector and major companies analysed within sector  Company 
weighting (%) 
FTSE Banks Index – FABANK (11 members) is a capitalization weighted index designed 
to measure the performance of banking companies within the FTSE All Share 
 
Barclays  12.5 
HBOS  12.7 
HSBC  32.7 
Lloyds  10.5 
RBOS  21.3 
StanChar  3.7 
Cumulative  93.4 
FTSE Insurance Index – FAINSU (15 members) is a capitalization weighted index 
designed to measure the performance of insurance companies within the FTSE All Share 
 
Amlin  8.0 
BritIns  12.1 
Hiscox  7.1 
Jardine  14.1 
RoyalSun  29.9 
Wellington  7.6 
Cumulative  78.8 
FTSE Investment Companies – FAINVC (115 members) is a capitalization weighted index 
designed to measure the performance of investment companies within the FTSE All Share 
 
3iGroup  13.0 
AllianceTrust  4.5 
EdinburghInv  2.4 
ForeignColonial  5.9 
RITCapital  2.4 
ScotInv  2.0 
ScotMort  2.9 
Witan  3.6 
Cumulative  36.7 
FTSE Life Assurance Index – FALIFE (7 members) is a capitalization weighted index 
designed to measure the performance of life assurance companies within the FTSE All 
Share 
 
Aviva  33.7 
Britannic  1.7 
Legal&General  19.6 
OldMutual  11.7 
Prudential  25.7 
Cumulative  92.4 
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Appendix I: Sector Volatility of Returns and Chi-Squared Test of pre versus post FSA firm 
specific distribution shift 
Table 1: Banks 
  Annualized Volatility of Returns 
FSA-Banks    
Barclays Volatility  Chi  Square 
T-1 0.169  0.00 
T 0.169   
HBOS     
T-1 0.253  3837.76 
T 0.216   
HSBC     
T-1 0.191  69542.52 
T 0.290   
Lloyds     
T-1 0.211  2220.33 
T 0.188   
Royal Bank of Scotland    
T-1 0.225  13657.88 
T 0.163   
Standard Charter     
T-1 0.312  3159.04 
T 0.271   
 
Table 2: General Insurance 
  Annualized Volatility of Returns 
FSA-FAINSU Volatility Chi-Square 
Wellington    
T-1 0.640  170818.16 
T 0.170   
RoyalSun     
T-1 0.160  228867.36 
T 0.310   
Jardine     
T-1 0.217  170.94 
T 0.210   
Hiscox     
T-1 0.746  213954.13 
T 0.170   
Brit Ins     
T-1 0.308  18651.55 
T 0.395   
Amlin     
T-1 0.424  35446.27 
T 0.242   
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Table 3: Life Insurance 
  Annualized Volatility of Returns 
FSA-LIFE Volatility  Chi-Square 
AVIVA    
T-1 0.186  21364.37 
T 0.242   
Legal&General    
T-1 0.244  3453.73 
T 0.210   
OldMutual    
T-1 0.267  5490.50 
T 0.310   
Prudential    
T-1 0.199  3805.91 
T 0.170   
Brittanic    
T-1 0.187  311628.29 
T 0.395   
 
Table 4: Investment Firms 
  Annualized Volatility of Returns 
FSA-INV Volatility  Chi-Square 
3i Group     
T-1 0.277  4405.98 
T 0.234   
Alliance     
T-1 0.086  3943.73 
T 0.073   
Edinburgh     
T-1 0.088  17412.19 
T 0.112   
ForeignCol     
T-1 0.110  291041.93 
T 0.227   
RIT Capital     
T-1 0.119  214.33 
T 0.115   
SCOTINV     
T-1 0.090  40151.23 
T 0.127   
SCOTMORTG     
T-1 0.127  1758.92 
T 0.114   
WITAN     
T-1 0.113  1393.59 
T 0.122   
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